Totalitarian societies, though willing to make tremendous economic and human sacrifices to advance the changes that their governments favor, failed to realize their prime goals of abolishing the state, religion, the class structure, or the profit motive. Just 10 and 15 years ago, underdeveloped countries were formulating master plans for their modernization; fewer than one out of ten were implemented even in part.
In short, various societies face significant differences in the complexity of their problems, in their respective capacities to handle them, and in the specific kinds of deficiencies their governing processes show. However, all societies have yet to learn to manage their affairs more effectively, to the extent that they wish to engage in such management.
We must first ask what additional capacities are necessary, and then ask what values an effectively managed society should seek to advance. I hold that it is possible to answer both questions. Progress in social science in recent years now permits the development of a Keynesian theory of societal processes; that is, a theory of the factors limiting our management capacity, and the conditions permitting improvement of our guiding capacity. I spent the past eight years recording and, to a degree, developing such a theory of societal guidance and outlined its major features in some 700 pages of The Active Society (Free Press, 1968) .
But having a theory, however valid, is only the first step towards its effective use. It took at least a generation after Keynes published his seminal book1 for it to become the basis for societal steerage. Hopefully, the lag between theory and application will be shorter in this instance.
A rough indication of the theory draws on an analogy with cybernetics.
Used mostly in mechanical and electrical systems, and now biological, cybernetics was originally the study of how to control groups of machines and guide them to work jointly to realize goals favored by the cybernetic overlayer. Four factors are present; the first is a command post of one or more centers that issues signals to the work unit. The second factor is tweway communication; lines carry instructions from the center(s) to the working units and carry information and responses from the units back to the center. While many cybernetic models omit the conception of power, we see it as a main third factor: if the steering units cannot back up their signals with rewards or sanctions, they will frequently be disregarded. The fourth factor is the distinction within the command centers between subunits that absorb and analyze incoming information and those that make decisions, i.e., between knowledge makers and policy makers.
When all these elements are available and functioning effectively, when communication lines are well hooked-up and not overloaded, when information and decision-making units have free access to each other, then we have an effective control system. Some engineers and managers think that a When a cybernetic model is applied to a social system, then one must take into account-that for both ethical and practical reasons--citizens cannot be coerced to follow "signals" unless those signals 'are to a significant exteni responsive to individual values and interests. If the citizens are forced, the system violates their rights and generates increasing levels of resistance. These become a major reason for the society being unable to manage its affairs effectively, whether in the collectivizing of farms or the abolishing of alcohol. Effective societal cybernetics requires that the downward flow of control signals from the government to the people be accompanied by effective upward flow from the people to the government and by that lateral flow of signals among citizens that expresses their values and needs. We refer to these upward and lateral flows which take the form of votes, letters to congressmen, petitions, and so forth, as "consensus-building." We call the combination of control and consensus-building (the societal cybernetic mechanism 1 societal guidance."
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The differences between active and passive societies, between those more and those less able to handle their Droblems. are best studied bv examining Y cybernetic factor at a time, Blthough effective guidance requires their bination. An examination of the amount of funds, the size of manpower, and the tent of expertise devoted to the collecting and processing of knowledg-as ompared to such other activities as the production of goods and service+ es an impression of how "knowledgeable" is a particular society, governnt, or federal agency. We are immediately struck with one reason societies en score poorly in self-management: they spend relatively very little on g and much more on "doing." And most of the funds that go into the tion of knowledge are earmarked for the natural sciences, for the study e nonsocial envirpnment.
When societies deal with poverty, riots, and urban problems, they often knowledge, and much of that incorrect, about what the underlying . For instance, for more than four decades the American society has a highly punitive policy against the users of marijuana. But the ons on which this policy is based, that the weed is damaging or that it rs to the consumption of other, clearly debilitating drugs, have yet emonstrated. Experts now urge the reduction of relief rolls by sending 00 mothers to work, leaving their children in day-care centers. Nobody t established whether or not the children's resulting psychological s will create more social costs and human misery than the system lue-ribbon commissions are appointed to study other issues, but these bodies tend to be composed of prestigious citizens, not experts, who can dedicate only a small part of their time to studying the issue at hand. The President's Commission on Civil Disorder completed its work in about seven months. But its members held full-time jobs "on the side," including the mayoralty of New York City and the top position of the United Steel Workers.
It's no wonder that only a few days could be devoted to the study of the causes and cures of riots. The situation in the relevant professions is not much better; most social scientists' work is not policy-oriented and not readily accessible to key decision-makers. Prestige and promotions go to those who work on esoteric subjects; applied research is frowned upon. Few corporations would open an overseas branch on the basis of such inadequate and amateurish studies as were conducted before several major national programs were launched. One example is Project Apollo; the key staff work was done over one weekend in the Spring of 1961. The knowledge that is available to experts must be communicated to societal decision-makers before it can be effectively utilized. Even in corporations, the planning units as well as the research and development units often have a hard time gaining the ear of key executives. In society the social distance between the research centers, where many of the experts work, and Washington is often vast. "Burned-out" scientists, academic statesmen, and "operators" frequently narrow the passage. Those federal agencies that have their own think tanks, such as the Air Force has in Rand, tend to do better in terms of their respective goals, which shows the importance of systematic 6 1 input" of information and analysis to policy makers. Obvious? Yes. Usually done? Not adequately.
The decision-making strategies employed by the "cybernetic centers" affect the quality of the societal efforts more than is realized. AngleSaxon societies are inclined to be pragmatic, to muddle through, making one small decision at a time, they abhor long-run encompassing planning. The approach is quite effective when the environment is relatively stable and the system basically sound; minor revisions do quite nicely then. But when basic turnabouts are required, something more than tokenism, they have a harder time adapting. A typical case in point is the manner in which the war in Vietnam was escalated, small step by small step, following neither a "dove" nor a "hawk" policy and it seems, without genuine attempts at basic change of policy.
Totalitarian societies often err in the opposite direction. They assume a greater capacity to control the society from one center, over more matters, and for a longer period of time than they are actually capable of. They therefore overplan and often launch major projects, "Great Leaps," only to be forced to scale them down or recast them a t tremendous economic and human cost.
It would be tempting to state that the most effective decision-making strategy is a happy medium between democratic underplanning and totalitarian overplanning. I t seems more precise to suggest that the capacity of both democratic and totalitarian societies to make encompassing and anticipatory decisions is rising with the improvements that have been occurring effectively manage the many matters that totalitarian states attempt to control, we have the capacity for more societal policy-making and guidance than democracies have assumed feasible.
I n addition, each society, to some degree, has the decision-making pattern it deserves. Decision-making strategies are not chosen in a vacuum but partially reflect the polltical structure of the society. Democratic societies tend to muddle through because there is no powerful central authority, even in the presidency, that can impose a master plan, even if this were desirable. The policies formulated are the outcome of the pushing and variety of interest groups, civic groups, political parties, and varying trends in public opinion. Under these circumstances, straight sailing seems difficult, zig-zagging is the natural course. Totalitarian societies -_ _ are more -able .. to follow one course but also much more likely to m interests of most of their constituencies. A "middling" policy-making, one more encompassing and "deeper" than democratic decision-makil much more humane than totalitarian decision-making requires not only new technologies of communication and control but also must be in the proper power constellation in society.
All societies may be viewed as compositions of groupings (social, regional, ethnic) differing in their share of societal assets and power. In our society, obviously, farmhands, white and black Southerners, and SpanishAmericans are among those who tend to have a share of power disproportionate to their numbers. The distribution of I significantly affects its capacity to treat its problems and to change its structure and course, if necessary. It is useful to consider the distribution power from two viewpoints: between the members of tl government (the cybernetic overlay), and among the members of the society.
The government and, more broadly, the state may overpower the society. This occurs when the statebureaucracies checkmate most other power centers, as in contemporary Egypt, or, more commonly do so in conjunction with some other organization, such as China did with its Commu On the other hand, the state may be overpowered by, and made as fragmented as, the society. This occqred in highly feudalistic societies such as ninthcentury France and continues to occur in contemporary tribal societies such as Nigeria.
When the state is overpowering, societal guidance tends to be unresponsive to most members' needs and values, as in Stalin's Rur it is overpowered, the major societal cybernetic overlayer is knocked out and the society drifts, as in many underdeveloped countries. Only a ten between society and state, each one guarding its aut relatively responsive and active societal guidance. Democracy itself requires such a power constellation: state power to limit conflicts amonj groupings (such as classes and races) to nonviolent give-and-take, and to I 314 REVIEW AND EXPOSITOR prevent the overpowering of some member grouping(s) by others; autonomous power of the citizens to maintain the capacity to change the government; that is, to remove those who guide the state if they cease to be responsive to the plurality of the citizens. Democracy, it follows, is more fully realized when the power differences among the member groupings are fewer.
As the needs of one member do not have a superior claim over those of any other, the only way to assure that a society will be responsive to the membership-at-large is to give all members as similar a grip on its guidance' mechanisms as is feasible. This means that not only the right to vote, but the socioeconomic and educational prerequisites for its effective use must be extended to all citizens before a democracy is fully operational.
The special features of the war on poverty can illustrate the effect of power relations on societal guidance. The 89th Congress was unusually liberal, due to the anti-Goldwater landslide of 1964, which elected Democrats and liberals where traditionally Republicans and conservatives were chosen. This, plus heavy pressure from the President, made for passage through 1,050 Community Action boards, set up to be recipients of anti-poverty funds and to manage their programs with "maximum feasible participation of the poor." Leaving aside the question of whether this was a wise approach from the viewpoint of the needs of the poor, it surely did not fit the existing power structure, because it bypassed city hall and the established welfare agencies. In 1966 a fair number of liberals were defeated, fewer than three per cent of the eligible poor voted in elections held to staff the Community Action boards, and by the end of 1967 the anti-poverty program was being structured to bring it under the control of local authorities. Similar points could be made with reference to bussing of school children, attempts to control smoking, or help for the farmhands. A social program needs political backing; if this cannot be marshalled, the program will sooner or later be modified or blocked.
The power relations among the groupings that make up a society shift over a perioh of time, due to a large variety of processes, including technological changes, the spread of education, and a rise in the level of selforganization of some previously less organized groups, for instance, the Negro Americans. As power relations change, new programs become feasible and old ones are undermined. I n other cases, new coalitions are formed; for instance, federal aid to education was initiated when a way was found to answer some of the needs of both public and parochial schools.
Fortunately, societal guidance is not only propelled by power but also b j genuine moral commitments of the citizens. People are motivated not only bJ self-interest but also by their conceptions of national pride, social justice, and freedom. Thus, American subscription to foreign aid, the United Nations, or civil rights can be explained, at best, only in part by the power of the advocates of these positions, which also appeal to values such as humanity, peace, and justice. These are values many citizens hold.
